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COMMUNICATING AT TOPOFF 2:  A KEYSTONE IN TERRORISM RESPONSE

By Christa M. Miller

 How can agencies best coordinate their efforts to determine who responds where and get what they need to be most effective? Furthermore, how do they address problems like equipment failure or interagency miscommunication?

Communications problems arose at TOPOFF 2000, the first federally directed, multistate drill held in May 2000. “Local, regional and state officials sometimes had trouble talking with federal officials,” reads an April 2003 article from the Tacoma (Washington) News Tribune. “And there was a crush of people who arrived quickly, overwhelming the Portsmouth [New Hampshire] fire chief who served as the incident commander.”

A year and a half later, radio signal problems contributed to hundreds of deaths at the World Trade Center. And, the News Tribune reported, “A Federal study released this month showed that Washington is one of 36 states which has not upgraded communications equipment enough to ensure that various agencies can talk to each other during a crisis.”

Both technical and organizational communications aspects then became a priority for May 2003’s TOPOFF 2 exercise. The end result: an improvement, but more work needed. “It’s not just an issue of equipment,” TOPOFF 2 Associate Director Corey Gruber was quoted as saying in a May 2003 NewsMax.com article. “Every agency has its own terminology and protocols for communication. If you put 121 of them together, communicating the same information about a scenario, you’ll find that each uses their own communications protocols, their own acronyms, etc. Making sure that everyone has a common operational picture is very complex and a real challenge.”

First Impressions: Seattle

Ready access to expert information, minimizing information confusion, and local/Federal team building were key during the mock “dirty bomb” attack in Seattle (Washington). A May 2003 press release from King County Executive Ron Sims pointed out specifically the first time activation of “a regional information center that coordinated information from cities, including Seattle, the state ... and many others. This group worked around the clock with briefings, updates, interviews, press releases, Web updates and more than 80 postings to a communal regional public information network which gets information out quickly from more than 50 jurisdictions and agencies around the region. In real emergencies, this is where many news agencies, as well as citizens, get information.”

The center’s main purpose was to keep the public apprised of unfolding events, but it also told county employees about “current work-related activities and duties.” Further, consolidating facilities housing the Seattle and King County emergency response teams and the county’s operations and information centers made decision-making easier.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported one major flaw in the massive response to the “attack”: Conflicting reports from the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency hurt responders’ efforts to warn and evacuate potential exposure zones in the city. Primarily a Federal problem, the miscommunication would nevertheless affect all first responders.

Other challenges to effective communication included the necessity for more computers and technology support, as well as better use of the media and agency liaisons for information sharing and dissemination. Still, Seattle Deputy Police Chief Clark Kimerer was quoted in the Post-Intelligencer as saying the city’s interagency communications system worked better than anticipated, though no details were provided.

Lessons Learned: Chicago

First responders in greater Chicago dealt with a pneumonic plague release scenario. Public health was the drill’s focus, but law enforcement-related scenarios included a building explosion and a hazardous materials release at a suburban chemical plant; a plane crash; and a Federal Bureau of Investigation raid on a covert biological laboratory.

The main attraction, says Larry Langford, Director of Media Relations at the Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications, was the city’s newly built joint operations center, whose hub consists of two rooms: a larger room containing three large console screens and a concave table with computer terminals for each department; and a smaller, conference style “strategy room.” “We put Federal, state, and local agencies in the large room,” says Langford, “and the public health agencies, which led the drill, in the smaller room.”

Lessons learned from breaking in the new operations center included changing protocols. “We realized that we can’t just provide each agency with a single computer,” Langford says. “The lead agency really needs several computers to function as a team.” Configuring the computers to meet this goal is not a problem, he says, so even allowing two agencies to share lead responsibilities, or mid incident switching of lead agencies, is not a problem.

Langford says the chemical plant explosion, located in Bedford Park, was meant to test the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS) which, in Illinois and southern Wisconsin, helps first responders organize their resources at large-scale events. The Associated Press reported problems among fire and police departments in that police had closed roads the fire department needed to access. “They figured their problems out,” says Langford. “That was the whole point of the drill.”

Langford says one unanticipated outcome of the drill was working with churches, community policing centers, and other local groups to reassure the public that what they were witnessing was only a drill. “If we were to experience a real attack,” he says, “we’d be able to rely on those groups once more to get information to the public quickly and reliably.”

First Impressions:
National Capital Region

The National Capital Region (NCR), which includes the District of Columbia and parts of Maryland and Virginia, used the TOPOFF 2 scenario to conduct its own separate, but concurrent, communications drill. “Sitting behind flat screen computers, [representatives from 26 Federal, state and private organizations] monitored newscasts and intelligence reports for updates on Seattle events,” reported a GovExec.com article. “As events unfolded on the West Coast, [the representatives] contacted capital area first responders, operating under the District of Columbia’s emergency response plan. At regular intervals, each organization provided an update to others in the room.”

The exercise tested the NCR’s “first alert” system, says Ralph Jones, Deputy State Coordinator of the Virginia Department of Emergency Management. Adds Don Lumpkins, Program Manager of the Maryland Emergency Management Agency’s Domestic Preparedness Division, “The exercise allowed us to see what kinds of decisions we’d need to make under a red threat level.” An exercise on a policy, rather than a first response, level, NCR 2 was meant “to get the top officials to teleconference on the same radio or phone line,” says Lumpkins.

Jones stresses the NCR drill was simply “an extension of the ongoing coordination effort among the jurisdictions which constitute the NCR.” That includes daily routines of ensuring key people, or their liaisons, could be brought in to teleconference on short notice. “We have a number of communications pathways and we wanted to make sure they would be open,” he says. “The system worked because we do this regularly.”

Although TOPOFF 2 was a larger-scale exercise than usual, Jones says the communications system wasn’t burdened. “In the District of Columbia, there are always events ongoing, demonstrations and so forth, which require resource outlays,” he says. “Any glitches we experienced were normal.” These could include, for example, updating rosters and contact information quickly. “If we see problems during the daily checks, we fix them on the spot,” he says, leading to seamless communication at larger events like TOPOFF 2. Lumpkins adds, “We’re fortunate because these issues have been addressed in the past, so the decisions we make don’t end up hurting [other jurisdictions].”

Communications Technology
at TOPOFF 2

Government Computer News reported that a Web portal designed by Extranet Secure Portals Group LLC of Arlington (Virginia) contributed to communications efforts. Theodore Macklin, a TOPOFF 2 Codirector who works in the Office of Domestic Preparedness, described the portal as “a password-protected, Web-based architecture which allows all the important responders to participate and get the data they need to do their jobs.”

Software built using Web technology – namely, Extensible Markup Language (XML) – aided interoperability. E Team, produced by Washington state-based E Team, Inc., improved communication among emergency responders. Federal Computer Week reported that E Team was being used, in particular, “to track pharmaceuticals from the national stockpile to determine how much we have, how do we ship them and tracking shipments of other supplies to a site.” E Team breaks down incident response into eight fundamental tasks: incident reporting and tracking; resource management; situation reporting; action planning; alert notification; GIS mapping; facility reporting; and personnel reporting.

Part of the NCR’s interface is a Web-based system called the Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS). Jones describes RICCS as similar to an Internet bulletin board with the added capability of paging key people when an event occurs. Running 24 hours a day, seven days a week, the redundant system (located in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia), it will facilitate the coordinated decision-making efforts Lumpkins describes.

Over the next few years, NCR communications will be improved. Some pilot programs include a public alert system which uses satellites to augment radio transmissions and an existing Web-based videoconference link. Upgrades to wireless communications and the radio system will also take place. And, says Jones, indoor radio antennae will be upgraded or installed per a new Virginia law passed as a direct result of 9/11.

First Impressions of Lessons Learned

Lumpkins says a key lesson learned was coordinated decision-making under a model being tested for the first time. “Because states are sovereign, we’re used to making our own decisions, but those have a ripple effect we didn’t see until it was down on paper.” As an example, “At the red threat level, Federal government buildings in the District close down,” he says. “Should we therefore close state government buildings, schools, or roads? What if the schools close in one state, but the kids’ parents work in the District? These decisions would have a domino effect on the rest of the NCR and people’s lives in general. We have to game them out so we don’t have to deal with them during a live event.”

Federal jurisdiction versus state sovereignty also came up in Seattle. A May 18 Seattle Times article noted, “At the moment, [local] antiterrorism measures often seem scattershot because decisions are made by local officials who must also weigh cost and inconvenience,” reads the article. One source, who had worked in the Defense Department, believes antiterrorism is not a “voluntary” responsibility for states.

 Yet, Federal mandates, says one Democratic state representative and Seattle Police Chief Gil Kerlikowske, won’t necessarily make people safer; ultimately, that’s up to locally elected and appointed officials. Kerlikowske believes “the national alert system will have to be worked out so law enforcement officials really understand what the different levels mean to their jurisdictions,” reads the article, which also quotes Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge acknowledging that “the Federal government has no first responders” and this contributes to the ultimate lack of control Federal officials have over local jurisdictions. “In the event of a real disaster, the Department of Homeland Security would only be able to watch as local police and firefighters handle the situation,” the article reads.

A possible solution: “Just as the U.S. Department of Transportation determines the freeway route and the thickness of the blacktop, the security agency would decide how to guard against a biological or chemical attack. Deterring smaller incidents, or fixing potholes, would fall to police and fire departments,” reads the article, attributing the idea to David McIntyre, Deputy Director of the nonprofit Anser Institute for Homeland Security.

Something Else Discovered

Another lesson learned came from a major difference between TOPOFF 2000 and TOPOFF 2. In the latter exercise, participants received more details about events than their counterparts in the earlier drill. Officials argued that, although this sacrificed some realism, the added planning time let them test communications more fully. Furthermore, James J. James, Director of the American Medical Association Center for Disaster Medicine and Emergency Response, was quoted as saying, “What you’re testing is capacity within the system, but, more importantly, the capacity within different agencies and systems to cross communicate and act together. The closer you come to making it realistic, you really are inviting injury or panic.”

Unscripted elements, like rumors of a second dirty bomb and aggressive media asking ad-libbed questions, helped provide a sense of realism to the exercise. Aggressive or not, the media were a key element in helping to inform the public and even some officials of transpiring events via mock satellite television channel. The Virtual News Network (VNN) let media disseminate critical information, including interviews of expert sources and statements from top officials.

Langford adds, “We learned that it’s critical to assign people to watch television. VNN deliberately injected false figures and fake experts into its broadcast, just to see how long it would take us to find out. Real networks will do that by accident and inflame the public to panic, so it’s absolutely essential to assign one person to each major channel to take notes. You need to deal with the flow of information which doesn’t originate from you, as well as what does.”

Other, more immediate problems – such as coordinating the opening of transportation corridors – were similar to issues experienced in TOPOFF 2000. “Are we going to see problems revealed which are vast or insurmountable or systemic?” the Seattle Times quoted Kimerer as saying. “I didn’t see that. I saw a lot of small or correctable things, nothing that would have led to more loss of life or put more people in danger.”

Another difference is that many agencies, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency, now fall under the Department of Homeland Security. The impact was primarily organizational; for instance, some key people’s contact numbers had been changed. Still, DHS believes their part in the operation – especially testing the threat advisory system, and placing a central federal official on the ground as the “eyes and ears” connecting local jurisdictions to Washington – was successful.

Officials point out that it will be a number of months before details become available about communications at TOPOFF 2. Sources say the government’s full after-action report will be complete by autumn. Yet, even the officials’ immediate impressions can aid interagency communications. “Everyone should try this type of drill,” says Lumpkins, noting that, eventually, NCR exercises will include Delaware, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. “Very few states actually attempt to have exercises across state lines, but we live in a commuter age, so we must know how to work across borders.”

About the Author: Christa Miller (cmmiller@psouth.net) is a freelance writer based in North Waterboro, Maine. She specializes in public safety issues.