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Protecting America’s Infrastructure:
Whose job is it?

Can We Afford to Police Every Target?

By Doug Fitzgerald

In the world that existed before September 11th, several of the larger architectural firms in the U.S. had already made it their specialty to design security into facilities of various kinds, with particular emphasis on criminal justice facilities and other government buildings. A few firms were even experienced in conducting high level assessments of security risks, followed by the recommendation and design of sophisticated countermeasures. No one, however, was ready with all the security answers when confronted by well financed and highly trained suicide terrorists whose goal was the mass destruction of largely undefended civilian targets. As a nation, we had simply not applied the highest security principles to the design and construction of public buildings, or to even the most vulnerable elements of our infrastructure. Such obvious targets as power and water utilities, communications hubs, chemical refineries, storage facilities for hazardous materials, and so on, were unguarded by much more than a chain-link fence, if that, and remain essentially exposed to risk to this day. We can argue endlessly about what preventative measures could have (or should have) been in place, but the fact is that our society was not yet prepared to face the inconvenience and the massive cost of building high security into our lives on so many levels.

After September 11th, our first reaction was to turn to our military and various law enforcement sources and, in some cases, to private security companies, to meet urgent security needs on many fronts. After all, nothing was quicker than simply posting guards at sensitive spots to keep the bad guys away. Virtually overnight, police officers found themselves guarding everything from airports to post offices to bridges and power plants. In the weeks and months that followed, it became clear that this could only be a stopgap solution. Reality began to set in – in terms of both cost and the allocation of resources. Even with federal dollars to help offset the expense, the nation could simply not afford to physically guard every potential target. Besides, if the police were going to guard the infrastructure, who was going to do traditional police work?

Designing Systems to Deter, Detect and Delay

With the perspective of time, we are learning that technology must be employed to do much of the job of protecting the infrastructure or, at the very least, to become the eyes and ears of law enforcement. We have also had time to see where demand has taken us in security terms, so we have a better idea of where to allocate resources and manpower, and how to design around specific security risks. We have now accepted the fact that America’s traditional police forces cannot realistically be expected to protect high-rise buildings from attack by airliners. The targets which are more likely in the future, and far more defendable by state and local police, are rail yards, power generating plants and transmission stations, water treatment facilities, and the like. At a water treatment facility, for instance, the job may be to isolate and protect railroad tank cars full of chlorine or ammonia; at other sites, there may be large storage tanks of propane to protect. At these facilities, a terrorist doesn’t need to bring an explosive device to create mayhem; the dangerous substances already on-site can become his very effective weapon. The security task becomes to physically protect these substances so that they cannot be used against the neighboring area with potentially devastating effect.

The three Ds (deter, detect and delay) can be applied in many permutations to make a given security task more manageable. In a rail yard which holds cars containing dangerous chemicals or substances, for instance, an interloper may be deterred and delayed by simply arranging rows of boxcars around the perimeter of the yard. This physical impediment slows the progress of a would-be aggressor by forcing him to crawl under row after row of boxcars to reach his target. Such a ploy will make motion detection easier and more certain, whether the system employs microwave, infrared, ported coaxial cable, or other electronic technology. The detection system may be augmented by a video system with which monitoring personnel can visually pinpoint the unauthorized person (or persons) and, perhaps, verify whether the intruder is carrying weapons, a backpack, etc. This added intelligence makes apprehension by law enforcement much more effective. Of course, involving law enforcement personnel only after an incursion has been confirmed will also be far more feasible from a cost standpoint. 

The same three D principles will apply whether the target is undefended cell phone towers, power transformers and towers, coaxial cables, or whatever. Police can only be used effectively in response to a confirmed act of aggression, not as a permanent guard service.

The Special Problems with Water Treatment Facilities

There is mounting evidence that al Qaeda has gathered information on American water treatment installations – long recognized as particularly difficult to defend. The raw water intake for these facilities is often a river or a reservoir which is easy to access over miles of unprotected shoreline. A recent incident in Hagerstown, Maryland, illustrates how vulnerable wastewater processing facilities can be. An apparent accidental release of a toxic chemical upstream from the treatment facility killed off sewage digesting bacteria employed by the plant. Disabled, the treatment plant had no choice but to release vast amounts of untreated sewage into local waterways which are depended upon by downstream communities for their drinking water. While this incident was apparently accidental, the implications for those who would create mischief are obvious.

The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of most water supply treatment facilities are also a potential target of malefactors. Anyone who gains access to such a system, which commands the facility’s valves, pumps and controls, can alter critical factors, such as filtration and coagulation cycles and their timing. The result can be insufficiently treated drinking water which contains dangerous levels of bacteria, toxic chemicals, or both. What is the solution? Once again, the only practical defense will be a combination of electronic and human monitoring systems which improve our three D capability, backed up by local law enforcement for physical apprehension.

At What Cost Is Peace of Mind?

As we settle into the new high security world of tomorrow, what have we learned about the art of the possible and the reality of the affordable? We have learned that we must make security a much higher priority in the design of public buildings. We must take a long and hard look at the curtailment of our trend toward the high-rise. We must choose sites with more deliberation, considering the need for setbacks and other factors affecting the defensibility of a facility. We must look toward decentralizing power, data and water treatment facilities, to make our utilities less susceptible to disabling attack. We must also recognize that biochemical agents will be the likely weapons of terrorists of the future, rather than explosives. Where existing facilities must be better defended, we have learned to apply the principles of the three Ds. When new construction is involved, we must learn to stop making the same old mistakes of the past.

About the Author: W. Douglas Fitzgerald, CPP, CFE, CSE, Sr. Vice President, Director of Security & Technology at HDR Architecture, Inc., can be reached at 455 South Orange Avenue, Suite 300, Orlando, FL 32801; phone (407)481-9944 or E-mail: wfitzger@hdrinc.com.